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Opening the electricity market to renewable energy sources would 
create flexibility for the further integration of renewable energy, lea-
ding to considerably lower costs and emissions. This requires the 
electricity markets to be reorganized in three ways. 
Firstly, most trading, and therefore production decision-making, is 
completed at least one day prior to electricity production. But it must 
be possible to make adjustments on shorter timescales, in order to 
effectively utilize wind forecasts, which are only relatively accurate a 
few hours ahead of production. 
Secondly, demand for operating reserve to stabilize the grid varies 
with the uncertainty of forecasts for wind and other generation. 
Most power plants can offer operating reserve, but only together 
with electricity. At present, however, operating reserve is traded se-
parately from electricity, often in long-term contracts. And thirdly, 
network operators generally compensate market participants for grid 
constraints. But with around 200 GWs of new wind and solar capa-
city being built by 2020, grid expansion must be combined with 
transparent, market-based congestion management.
The introduction of an independent system operator offering an inte-
grated platform for short-term power trading using a pricing system 
that internalises network constraints (»nodal pricing«) could meet 
these conditions, allowing further openings of the power market for 
renewable electrical energy. Experience in the US and simulations 
for Europe show that international transmission capacity is up to 
30% better utilized, congestion management alone yielding annual 
savings of 1 - 2 billion euros.
The deregulated electricity market was designed with 
conventional power generation in mind, but the require-
ments are changing with the rise of renewable energy.
Wind and solar energy production is dependent on wea-
ther conditions, which cannot be accurately predicted. 
It must thus be possible to coordinate with other power 
plants‘ production on short notice, i.e. up to only a few 
hours prior to delivery. The shorter time horizon is ac-
companied by a spatial challenge stemming from the fact 
that wind and solar power plants are connected to a net-
work already being used by conventional power plants. 
Transmission capacity must now be flexibly allocated 
and expanded where production is concentrated. 
In planning for the evolution of the electricity market, 
both the temporal and the spatial dimensions must be 
simultaneously taken into account. European national 
action plans for renewable energy envisage 200 GW of 
additional wind and solar capacity by the year 2020. It 
is not economically, environmentally or politically viable 
to expand networks to such an extent that transmission 
constraints never occur. Instead, what is important is to 
efficiently expand the grid while simultaneously imple-
menting effective congestion management.
Integration of renewable energy poses new 
challenges 
Energy production using coal, nuclear fuel and gas can 
be planned over the long term. Most output is traded no 
later than at the auction on the day before production; 
which has proven an appropriate practice in the past. 
The situation is different with wind power, however, as 
weather and wind forecasts are rather imprecise. Taking 
Spain as an example, Figure 1 shows that forecasts are 
considerably more accurate up to four hours ahead of real 
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the option to receive a variable market premium instead 
of fixed compensation when they market their own pow-
er3. This premium charge is to be passed on to the con-
sumer, and gives plant operators a business incentive 
to effectively market their electricity. However, the op-
tional premium model does not solve the fundamental 
problems with short-term trading (fragmentation, par-
ticipation and transparency) or grid problems: they are 
only partially alleviated.
the key role of the independent system 
operator
Platform for short-term energy trading
In most deregulated electricity markets in the US, an 
independent system operator (ISO) has been introdu-
ced who conducts the central auction on the day prior 
to electricity delivery. Specific power plant characteris-
tics may also be stated (such as plant start-up duration 
and cost, minimum and maximum electricity produc-
tion and adjustment period). 
The auction outcome corresponds initially with previ-
ous-day electricity European exchange trading. Howe-
ver, the ISO retains the supply parameters for the remai-
ning hours until delivery. The auction outcome is upda-
3   German government (2011): Report on Renewable Energy Sources Act, 
Federal Government draft, Version 03.05.2011.
time. While forecasting has generally improved, inaccu-
racies cannot be eliminated, even in Germany1.
Wind turbine operators and their representatives thus 
would like to trade power a few hours prior to produc-
tion, but the previous day‘s central electricity auction 
is already over.
If wind forecasts indicate lower wind power generati-
on versus the day-ahead forecasts, conventional pow-
er plants need to increase their own production accor-
dingly. This considered, there are three reasons why in 
today‘s market the most suitable, cost-effective power 
plants are not always used.
Fragmentation •	 : In most cases, production only has 
to be adjusted for a few hours at a time to meet de-
mand. Power plants need to be able to start up or in-
crease production in exactly that period. But in the 
bilateral intraday market, plants with the right loca-
tion and availability are relatively hard to find.
Participation •	 : Not all conventional power plants able 
to supply surplus electricity have a trading depart-
ment that is open 24 hours a day.
Transparency •	 : Electricity prices in short-term bilate-
ral trading are difficult for small suppliers and com-
petition regulators to monitor, as prices in bilateral 
trading include a variety of costs not limited to fuel 
costs, but also a margin covering fixed costs and costs 
for power plant start-up and adjustments.
 
Reduction of power plant overcapacity and rising de-
mand for flexible production are increasing the oppor-
tunities and incentives for participants to exercise mar-
ket power. In the bilateral intraday market, it is however 
difficult to verify whether a power plant has offered all 
options for producing on short notice or adjusting pro-
duction while offering a ‘fair’ price for the output.
In the past, most renewable electricity in Germany has 
been produced in accordance with the German Renewa-
ble Energy Sources Act (EEG), and thus was marketed by 
transmission network operators –until 2008 all expected 
wind output was sold in the day-ahead power exchange, 
and since 2009 in short-term intraday trading as well. 
This has increased liquidity in intraday trading2.
The next step proposed for the EEG by the German 
government is to offer renewable electricity producers 
1   Dena Grid Study II – Integration of renewable energy into the German 
electricity network in the period from 2015-2020 with a view to 2025), Berlin 
2010.
2   Weber, C. (2010): Adequate intraday market design to enable the 
integration of wind energy into the European power systems. Energy Policy no. 
7, 3155–3163.
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Source: Based on data from Red Eléctrica de España, SA, error calculation for 2009/2010 adjusted, thus no 
direct comparability.
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Just a few hours ahead of production, the wind forecasting error rate falls below 
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local wind speeds exceed the limit of wind turbines and 
they are shut down increases. Operating reserve can only 
be efficiently provided when the amount is determined 
on short notice based on information about the status 
of all power stations6.
6   EWIS (2010): European Wind Integration Study – Towards a successful 
integration of wind power into European Electricity Grids. ENTSO-E Premises, 
March 2010.
ted to reflect any short-term changes in production and 
demand. All supply offers can still be included (parti-
cipation) and specific power plant characteristics taken 
into account (fragmentation). Transparency is created 
by separately listing the cost components of offers and 
the operational requirements, and the ISO conducts the 
auction according to a clearly defined algorithm. Mar-
ket participants benefit from this approach, as they are 
paid for all adjustments versus the previous day‘s auc-
tion outcome, while electricity consumers benefit from 
the algorithm‘s day-ahead and intraday optimization ac-
ross the entire power system that lowers costs4.
Combined trading of energy and operating reserve
Separate marketplaces were introduced in Germany 
upon deregulation of the electricity sector. Electricity 
supply firms buy electricity from power plants to meet 
their own customers‘ demand, and transmission net-
work operators pay power plants for providing operating 
reserve (Box 1). This reserve power is utilized to balance 
out real-time fluctuations in production and demand.
In the past, power plants have sold energy and opera-
ting reserve separately and to different groups of buy-
ers. This worked as long as it was possible to plan and 
coordinate coal, gas and nuclear energy production over 
the long term. If it is known which power plants are pro-
ducing what amount of electricity, it is clear who is able 
to provide operating reserve. A wind farm can only do 
this when the wind is blowing. Therefore, it cannot sell 
operating reserve over a long-term period. 
With electricity production from wind and sun increa-
sing, conventional power plants must adjust their pro-
duction to the supply situation on a more short-term 
basis, making the power system less predictable. Pro-
viding operating reserve thus becomes more complica-
ted. If, on the other hand, electricity and operating re-
serve can be traded together on a short-term basis, all 
technologies can play a role in providing system servi-
ces, thus reducing costs and emissions5.
Optimal provision of operational reserve
The volume of operational reserve required is not fixed 
but depends on the current state of the system. For ex-
ample when wind speeds are high, the probability that 
4   Muesgens, F., Neuhoff, K. (2002): Modelling Dynamic Constraints in 
Electricity Markets and the Costs of Uncertain Wind Output, EPRG Working 
Paper Series 0514; TradeWind (2009): Integrating Wind. Project report for the 
trade-wind study coordinated by the European Wind Energy Association 2009.
5   Smeers, Y. (2008): Study on the general design of electricity market 




Operating reserve is utilized to ensure that electric pow-
er supply always precisely matches electricity demand. 
It is used to balance out the effects of short-term po-
wer plant failures, fluctuations in demand and load or 
wind forecasting inaccuracies. There are three types of 
operating reserve, reflecting the technical capabilities 
of traditional technologies:
Primary operating reserve is available within 30 se- •	
conds for a period of 15 minutes. It can be produced 
by all major thermal power plants by exploiting the 
inertia in a steam cycle and temporarily heightened 
steam production.
Secondary operating reserve is available within five  •	
minutes, for a minimum period of 60 minutes. It is 
provided by starting up rapid output generation 
plant such as pumped storage power stations and 
gas turbines, or by increasing the output of power 
plants already running at below capacity.
Tertiary operating reserve is available within 15  •	
minutes. The longer warning time allows including 
different types of power plants and power buyers, 
usually by notifying industrial firms by telephone.
Many renewable energy sources and demand side res-
ponse can provide operating reserve both rapidly and 
over an extended period of time. However, they have 
to restrict their supply of operating reserve to cate-
gories/rules defined for conventional power plants. 
This reduces the amount they are able to supply to 
the power system, and for which they are paid (if not 
covered by the EEG). 
Additionally, bids by transmission network operators 
for primary and secondary operating reserve apply for 
a whole month. This prevents wind energy from par-
ticipating, as it will not be able to provide operating 
reserve when there is no wind.19 DIW Economic Bulletin 1.2011
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Demand adjustment in operating reserve: Would  •	
operating reserve energy storage be adjusted for sys-
tem requirement?
Power plant flexibility: Can power plants trade ener- •	
gy in flexibly defined blocks of several hours (frag-
mentation)? The past saw predefined blocks of hours 
formed for trading in day and base load. Wind pow-
er does not follow these rigid structures.
International market integration: Can energy and  •	
operating reserve be sourced from other countries 
on short-notice, and is the market compatible with 
congestion management?
Transparency: Is there enough transparency for ef- •	
fective market supervision? This is especially impor-
tant in short-term markets as they are predestined 
for exercising market domination for three reasons: 
First, the number of market participants is small - of-
ten only a few power plants offer the necessary flexi-
bility and are in a suitable operating mode at appro-
priate locations. Second, production in hydro-elec-
tric power and conventional power plants changes 
with the production from wind and solar power. This 
will reduce the share of power output that already is 
committed based on long-term contracts, and incre-
ases the importance of short-term trading. Without 
coverage of output by long-term contracts, the most 
important mechanism in reducing incentives to exer-
cise market power breaks. Third, the cost structures 
of the power stations bids are difficult to determine 
as they can reflect stand-by, start-up, and adjustment 
costs and can include the scarcity value.
 
A functional market that fulfils these criteria ensures 
fair power prices for final customers and reduces the 
costs of integrating wind and solar power, while pro-
moting market opportunities for small suppliers that 
cannot optimize within the portfolios provided by po-
wer plants.
Qualitative evaluation in Figure 2 shows that the cur-
rent electricity market does not provide the flexibility re-
quired for effectively integrating renewable energy. Ful-
filling individual criteria is not enough – an integrated 
solution is required. The market model with an ISO, as 
introduced in most of the liberalized US markets, ful-
fils these new requirements. The comparison assumes 
that the ISO – as is the case in US examples – provides 
the platform for the short-term energy market.
Three factors explain the good results that this model 
shows. First, the ISO carries unequivocal responsibility 
for the system. Second, an independent system opera-
tor has all of the major information on the system and 
holds the responsibility for implementing efficient and 
safe system operation. The ISO uses a uniform auction 
Transmission network operators, however, only have li-
mited information on the status, the operational sche-
dule of power plants and on neighbouring networks. Ac-
cordingly, it is difficult for them to optimize their pro-
vision of operating reserve.
Defining new categories of operating reserve
The ability to market new energy and system services 
is essential in opening the market to new technologies. 
Wind turbines, battery storage and demand manage-
ment have completely different reaction times and ope-
rating periods compared to »traditional« types of opera-
ting reserve. However, they still have to serve the rigid 
auction formats matching traditional categories. 
The integrated auction mechanism for energy and ope-
rating reserve used by ISOs allows the flexible formu-
lation of specific technical options. In turn, this allows 
new technologies to be contracted and remunerated ac-
cording to technological ability, boosting the incentives 
for innovation and investment.
Enhancing competition in trade
ISOs play a clearly defined role in providing a platform 
for day-ahead and intraday energy trading, but are not 
involved in longer-term energy trading. This allows for 
competition among trading platforms to host trades of 
longer-term energy products.
To implement market coupling between countries, one 
power exchange from each country is linked to the in-
ternational clearing mechanism. This power exchange 
thus becomes the preferred place for short-term tra-
ding. The price on the power exchange is usually taken 
as a reference value for trading of derivatives, thus crea-
ting an incentive to also trade derivatives on the same 
platform and reducing competition with other trading 
platforms.
European markets too inflexible in the 
short term
The discussion up to now has shown some of the chal-
lenges in integrating renewable energy that have resulted 
from the current market design. An ISO may lend fle-
xibility to a platform for short-term trade in energy and 
operating reserve. This becomes apparent by comparing 
selected countries according to the following criteria:
Efficient use of power plants: Would this optimize  •	
production across power plants towards an efficient 
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market entrants a chance. As it was difficult for third 
parties to verify calculations of costs and commercial 
available transmission capacity of vertically integrated 
electricity companies, regulators created uniform price 
zones and rules for international electricity transfers. 
Constraints within countries were not explicitly repre-
sented in the market design. Instead, the dominant com-
panies were required to resolve constraints within their 
own supply areas. These companies owned almost all 
of the power plants that both contributed to constraints 
and were necessary to resolve them, and were thus in a 
good position to carry out the task.
Unbundling of electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution has reduced the ability of network operators 
to resolve constraints by adjusting production in their 
own power plants. Also more players – including rene-
wable energy – contribute to grid constraints, and have 
to be included in congestion management. This requi-
res transparent congestion management to solve con-
flicts between technologies (e.g. feed-in priority accor-
ding to the German Renewable Energy Sources Act), as 
well as a credible basis for decisions on extending the 
network. However, the most important aspect is effecti-
ve usage of grid capacity for increased inclusion of rene-
wable energy and a secure European electricity supply.
Faced with increasing congestion on the network, costs 
to resolve transmission constraints and mitigate any 
risks to grid stability rise with uncoordinated conges-
tion management7. Producers and traders can report 
their schedules to the network operators up to a quar-
ter of an hour before real time. This gives the network 
operator a very limited time window to recognize and 
remedy any possible constraints. To make matters wor-
se, the number of power plants located at suitable grid 
nodes and are in a position to react within the necessa-
ry timeframe is limited. For this reason, transmission 
system operators retain the right to refuse short-term 
changes in schedule8. However, this poses a challen-
ge for short-term bilateral energy trade if agreed energy 
transfers can subsequently not be executed.
However, the alternative of subjecting the transmission 
system operator to the obligation to carry out all tran-
sactions is equally unsatisfactory. As soon as congesti-
on is expected, even small producers in regions of an 
7   Improved coordination would not have prevented the reasons for previous 
blackouts, but would probably have prevented their broad spread (USA and 
Italy 2003, UCTE 2006. Bialek , J. W. (2007): Why has it happened again? 
Comparison between the 2006 UCTE blackout and the blackouts of 2003. IEEE 
PowerTech Conference, Lausanne.
8   Tennet (2011): Bilanzkreisvertrag zwischen TenneT TSO GmbH und BKV 
(Area supply regulation contract between Tenne T TSO GmbH and BKV), www.
tennettso.de, May 4 2011.
platform that takes every bid from market players to find 
an ideal market solution across the system. Third, the 
clearing algorithm in the auction platform represents 
the technical reality of the electricity system. Most US 
regions with liberalized electricity markets have since 
switched to this market model combining an ISO with 
nodal pricing after its introduction in the integrated elec-
tricity markets of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Mary-
land (PJM) in 1998.
network congestion gaining relevance in 
the electricity market
Up to now, electricity has been traded on a nationwide 
wholesale basis at a uniform electricity price in Germa-
ny. This uniform price zone may turn out to be a seri-
ous challenge to the energy revolution. Producers and 
traders may freely choose where to supply electricity to 
the grid and where to draw electricity from the grid. This 
leads to situations where the planned electricity trans-
mission is greater than the transmission capacity of the 
grid. Intervention is required from the network operator 
in order to ensure network stability. The operator pays 
the power plants contributing to the grid overload to re-
duce electricity production and conversely, pays power 
plants in other regions to replace the electricity (known 
as redispatching).
There are historical reasons for the congestion manage-
ment we have today. European electricity markets were 
liberalized at the end of the twentieth century, when the 
electricity companies were vertically integrated. Simple, 
clear rules were necessary to give competition and new 
Figure 2
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Integration, www.climatepolicyinitiative.org.
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The European markets do not do justice to requirements with regard to integra-
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sequently pay the producer for adjusting production to 
resolve these constraints.
Introducing market based congestion 
management
Initial experience with market-based congestion ma-
nagement on the international electricity markets has 
been positive in Europe. First, auctions were introduced 
for transmission capacity between individual countries. 
Only those that purchase transmission capacity can re-
gister for electricity trades between countries. Separa-
te auctions for transmission rights and energy have not 
yielded an efficient market result – even after years of 
operation. Therefore electricity markets have been incre-
asingly coupled directly to one another – market players 
submit their bids for electricity production at their na-
tional electricity exchanges. A common algorithm de-
termines the market price in individual countries, and 
uses the transmission capacity available between the 
countries to balance out price differences as far as pos-
sible. Common optimization across several price zones 
is referred to as market coupling.
Norway and Sweden often experience transmission con-
straints between hydro-electric plants in the north and 
demand in the south. Several price zones have been in-
troduced within the countries for this reason. Howe-
ver, defining price zones within a country proved dif-
ficult, even with the simple structure of the Scandina-
vian supply network10.
In technical terms, the price zones should be formed in 
such a way that transmission constraints occur between 
the zones, where they are solved by market means, rather 
than by redispatching within a zone. However, the con-
gested lines can change after grid extensions, or with 
the connection of new power plants or added demand. 
In each instance new price zones would have to be de-
fined. This is unsettling for investors and dealers, as 
they have no way of telling whether their trading partner 
will remain within the same price zone or not. Possible 
changes in price zones also make it difficult for an ISO 
(in this case, Nord Pool), to conclude long-term trans-
mission agreements with market players between price 
zones. This is a challenge to long-term contracting and 
thus also for investment in generation capacity.
Defining price zones in Europe‘s continental electrici-
ty network is even more difficult. Figure 3 shows how 
tightly meshed the transmission network is. The simu-
lation represents electricity production in a randomized 
10   Bjorndal, M., Jörnsten, J. (2007): Benefits from Coordinating Congestion 
Management – the Nordic Power Market. Energy Policy, 35 (3), 1978–1991.
export constrained area within a price zone would profit 
from first selling additional production, and then being 
paid by the transmission system operator for reducing 
production. In the autumn of 1998, this caused a failu-
re on the British gas market9, and was one of the most 
important factors in the failure of the Californian elec-
tricity market in the years 2000/2001. Both cases were 
triggered by increases in congestion levels.
Increasing constraints in germany 
In the past few years, increased electricity production 
from wind turbines has increased demands on the Ger-
man grid. The situation began with a relatively well-de-
veloped national grid. The German grid had long since 
been up to the demands put to it, and the network ope-
rators contributed to improved grid capacity utilization 
with overhead cable monitoring. The years 2009 and 
2010 saw two particular events which reduced electricity 
transmission from northern to southern Germany. 
Reduced precipitation led to a reduction of hydro-elec-
tric power in Norway, with power imported also from 
Northern Germany to make up the difference. In ad-
dition, two nuclear power plants in northern Germa-
ny were out of action for servicing. Even if it is unclear 
what impact accelerated departure from nuclear energy 
will have on electricity transmission in Germany, one 
thing remains certain – investment in wind power in 
northern Germany will take a disproportionate share of 
future investment. In general, transmission constraints 
in Germany will likely undergo a sharp increase. This 
calls for extension to the grid while introducing appro-
priate congestion management to use the existing ca-
pacity efficiently.
uniform wholesale price untenable in 
germany
An argument that is often raised is that extending the 
grid to a sufficient extent will be enough to retain the 
uniform price zone. However, other transmission net-
works are not placed under such expectations. Capaci-
ty on rail, road and in the air usually falls short of de-
mand at peak times. Flight prices, railway contingency 
ticketing and longer periods spent in traffic congesti-
on often encourage travellers to alter their route or time 
of travel. In contrast, in the current power market de-
sign electricity producers are rewarded for congestion 
occurring on the network as the transmission system 
operators – and therefore also the end customer – sub-
9   McDaniel, T., Neuhoff, K. (2003): Auctions to gas transmission access: The 
British experience. In: M. C. 50W Janssen (Publ.): Auctions and Beauty 
Contests: A policy perspective. Cambridge.DIW Economic Bulletin 1.2011 22
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re constraints often changed12. This resulted in exces-
sive complexity in trading and operation. For this rea-
son, the market system was transferred to a system of 
nodal prices as shown in Box 2.
12   Hogan, W. (2000): Flowgate Rights and Wrongs. Harvard University.
wind situation assuming extended wind power. The dar-
ker lines represent heavier line load. Effective conges-
tion management would prevent overload on individu-
al lines. Many of the constraints have turned out to be 
within, and not between EU countries11. This speaks in 
favour of introducing price zones within national bor-
ders as well.
However, constraints do not only move with new invest-
ments, but also with changes in wind or demand situ-
ation, as the Scandinavian experience shows. National 
price zones need to be divided into smaller price zones, 
but defining them in such a way as to keep them stable 
is a difficult task. This matches the US experience after 
liberalizing the integrated electricity markets in Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey and Maryland (PJM). First, conges-
tion management was only introduced for transmission 
lines that had often been subject to constraints. How-
ever, ever-increasing numbers of lines had to be inclu-
ded since the electricity transmission flow and therefo-
11   EWIS (2010): European Wind Integration Study – Towards a successful 
integration of wind power into European Electricity Grids. ENTSO-E Premises, 
March 2010.
Figure 3
line loads – simulation for Europe with 12.5% wind power 
Dark lines = heavy load, light lines = less load.
Source: Neuhoff K, and J. Barquin, J. Bialek, R. Boyd, C. Dent, F. Echavarren, T. Grau, C. von Hirschhausen, B. 
Hobbs, F. Kunz, C. Nabe, G. Papaefthymiou, C. Weber, H. Weigt (2011): Renewable Electric Energy Integra-
tion: Quantifying the Value of Design of Markets for International Transmission Capacity, CPI Report. www.
climatepolicyinitiative.org.
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Box 2
Keyword: nodal prices
Nodal prices are used for market-based congestion 
management. They may be regarded as an extension of 
market coupling. In today's market coupling systems, 
electricity auctions take place the day before for each 
price zone – such as the EEX in Germany and the APX 
in the Netherlands. The transmission system operators 
inform the exchanges taking part in the common auction 
program as to how much transmission capacity will be 
available between the price zones. The auction mechanism 
automatically plans for this in order to transfer electricity 
from price zones with low prices to price zones with higher 
prices. This leads to a convergence in price, often resulting 
in a single uniform price.
The more transmission constraints exist in the system, the 
smaller the price zones become for a uniform price to be 
applied to. Nodal pricing involves defining an individual 
price for each network node, typically connection points 
to the high-voltage network. If there are no constraints, 
neighbouring prices will still converge.
Usually, an independent system operator (ISO) will be 
ordered to implement the nodal prices. The ISO may take 
thermal, voltage and other technical network limitations 
into account in the auction mechanism. This makes 
effective and safe network utilization possible. In addition 
to the financially binding auction price from the previous 
day, the ISO also conducts several auctions during the 
course of the current day. This allows optimization across 
the whole system if forecasts for production and demand 
should change.
The ISO, usually a not-for-profit body, acts according 
to clearly defined algorithms and procedures, and can 
therefore act in the interest of the community without 
commercial involvement. The ISO only offers a platform 
for short-term trading, and publishes reference prices. Any 
longer-term trading will only take place bilaterally or at 
auctions.23 DIW Economic Bulletin 1.2011
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Introducing financial transmission rights was a central 
factor in the success of congestion management on the 
liberalized US electricity markets; physical transmis-
sion rights and other claims on the network were con-
verted into financial transmission rights. This created 
legal security and acceptance. Financial transmission 
rights exist for time periods of up to thirty years in the 
US which protects investments against possible chan-
ges in network structure or utilization. A liquid market 
for financial transmission rights at periods of several 
years has established itself, which completes the picture 
in energy trading. 
A pragmatic solution using nodal pricing was also found 
for household electricity supplies in most states. The 
whole state determines and applies a unified electrici-
ty price for households.
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Nodal pricing is a market-based system of congestion 
management13. Up to now, electricity was only traded 
in one price zone under market coupling. Transmissi-
on system operators inform the electricity exchanges on 
the amount of transmission capacity available between 
national price zones. The common auction mechanism 
in the exchanges uses this information to plan trans-
fers from low-price price zones to high-price price zo-
nes, thus also adjusting prices at the same time. Given 
sufficient free transmission capacity, this will result in 
a uniform electricity price. The more transmission con-
straints exist in the system, the smaller the price zones 
become that a uniform price can be applied to according 
to the Norwegian model. Nodal pricing involves always 
defining an individual price for each network node for 
this reason. If there are no binding constraints, prices 
in neighbouring nodes will converge.
In the European RE-Shaping Project, several European 
research organizations have simulated the European 
electricity system in order to quantify the effect of no-
dal pricing on the European market. First, the project 
involved modelling the electricity market with further 
development of zonal pricing, and the result was com-
pared against a nodal pricing situation. Improvement 
in network utilization enables an increase of up to 30% 
in power to be transmitted between different regions. 
This matches the experience reported in the US on in-
troducing nodal pricing14.  The simulation results also 
show that effective network utilization would save an-
nual fuel costs and emission rights by one to two bil-
lion euros15.
financial transmission rights key to 
introducing market-based congestion 
management
Clear definition and allocation of ownership rights are 
important for economic efficiency. Difficulties arise 
where ownership rights have been awarded more than 
once. This will be the case as long as market players are 
able to lay claim to customary rights to transmission 
rights unlimited by time or scope. One pragmatic solu-
tion could be for financial transmission contracts to be 
offered instead (Box 3).
13   Schweppe, F., Caramanis, M., Tabors, R., Bohn, R. (1988): Spot Pricing of 
Electricity. Kluwer Academic Press.
14   Mansur, E. T., White, M. W. (2009): Market organization and efficiency in 
electricity markets. http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/mawhite/.
15   Neuhoff K, and J. Barquin, J. Bialek, R. Boyd, C. Dent, F. Echavarren, T. 
Grau, C. von Hirschhausen, B. Hobbs, F. Kunz, C. Nabe, G. Papaefthymiou, C. 
Weber, H. Weigt (2011): Renewable Electric Energy Integration: Quantifying the 
Value of Design of Markets for International Transmission Capacity, CPI Report. 
www.climatepolicyinitiative.org
Box 3
Keyword: financial transmission rights
Financial transmission rights remunerate the owner for pri-
ce differences between two zones or nodes in the network. 
This allows longer-term electricity trading, such as where 
Power Plant at Node A sells electricity to a customer at 
Node B at a set price for one year. The power plant would 
sell electricity from Node A to buy it for the customer 
from Node B on a daily basis in the auction. The possible 
price difference – therefore the risk – would be secured by 
payments from the financial transmission rights.
If the sales price at Node A should fall short of the produc-
tion costs of the power plant on a certain day, the power 
plant operator would be given the option of not producing 
any electricity. This would mean additional profit at the 
level of difference between the price at Node A and the 
power generation costs saved. Nodal pricing thus creates 
an incentive for flexible electricity production while 
financial transmission rights additionally secure long-term 
agreements and investments. DIW Economic Bulletin 1.2011
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